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48 MARKET 
entered into alliance with his government. But the pi-
ety, learning, seriousness, and political quietism of Aya-
tollah Khii'l gained him a broad international following 
and, consequently, control of immense wealth. This he 
administered with a quiet institutio11-building skill. Liv-
ing in Najaf, his indifference to political power was al-
ways interpreted as distaste for the Iraqi leader, Saddam 
Hussein, and may have become active opposition during 
the Shi'i revolt in southern Iraq which followed the Gulf 
War of r990-r99r. His institutional legacy lies in an 
extraordinary international network of mosques, 
schools, libraries, and other charitable institutions, 
which, through his rulings, have been integrated into 
the existing structures of national and international bod-
ies, from London and New York to Bombay, Islam-
abad, Malaysia, and Thailand. How this will survive is 
still uncertain. The enduring legacy of his thought is 
likewise uncertain, but markedly pragmatic and eirenic, 
it might turn Out to be more significant for the needs of 
the Shi'l community in the twenty-first century than 
that of Khomeini. 
[See also Ayatollah; Ithna 'Asharlyah; Najaf; Qom; 
Shl'l Islam; and the biographies of Borujerdi, Kho'i, and 
Khomeini.] 
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Legal Foundations and Modern Practice. For related dis-
cussions, see Family Law; Mut'ah; Polygyny; Women 
and Islam, article on Role and Status of Women.] 
Legal Foundations 
The Qur'an is the foundation of all Islamic laws, includ-
ing laws of marriage and divorce. Where a matter is not 
addressed specifically there, or where the application of 
a verse to a certain situation permits several reasonable 
interpretations, jurists look to the sunnah of the Prophet 
(including /µldfth) for additional guidance. Where nei-
ther the Qur'an nor sunnah address a matter explicitly, 
jurists resort to ijtihiid, a system of reasoning and inter-
pretation for which they have articulated several basic 
principles. Chief among these is the principle that laws 
vary with time, place, and circumstance. This principle 
was adopted to emphasize the fact that Islam is a reli-
gion for all times and all people, and that therefore each 
culture is permitted, within the bounds of Qur'anic in-
junctions, to have a reasonable degree of flexibility in 
interpreting and applying Islam to its own community. 
The ijtihiid of jurists on matters of marriage and di-
vorce was significantly influenced by their milieu. Often 
local gender, class, and political preferences filtered into 
Islamic consciousness and were incorporated as part of 
regional Islamic legal tradition. 
Originally, Muslim family law was not codified. 
Judges who were faced with an issue relied directly on 
the Qur'an and ~adith and, where necessary, on their 
own ijtihiid. As the schools of legal thought gained 
prominence, Muslim states began selecting the jurispru-
dence of one of these schools as the basis of their legal 
systems. There are significant jurisprudential differ-
ences not only among the schools, but also among schol-
ars within each school. 
Most Muslim countries today have codified their fam-
ily laws. In each case, the code was based primarily on 
the jurisprudence of a single school; however, for a vari-
ety of reasons, a code sometimes combined this juris-
prudence with that of other schools. Such an approach, 
wht>n consistent and orooerlv reasoned, is fully permis-
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view has survived to the present in most Muslim coun-
tries, although recently it has again become the subject 
of debate. The barring of women from judicial posi-
tions, however, has significantly affected the develop-
ment of Islamic jurisprudence, especially in the area of 
family law. Despite their differences, the various 
schools appear to base their jurisprudence on a tradi-
tional patriarchal view of males as rational, courageous, 
and firm and of females as emotional, weak, and rash. 
Consequently, many of the laws have been justified ex-
plicitly on this basis, although exceptions do exist. 
For example, the major schools (Malik!, I:Ianbali, 
I:lanafi, Shafi'i and Ja'fari) generally agree that a Mus-
lim woman needs a wall (guardian, usually her father) 
to enter into a marriage, but they disagree significantly 
as to the extent, nature, and duration of the wali.'s au-
thority. Most major schools agree that a father acting as 
wali can force his virgin daughter to marry a man of his 
choice, regardless of her age. This position was justified 
on the basis that virgins lack experience in men and may 
be subject to emotion in making their marriage decision. 
However, if a father declares his daughter mature or if 
she was previously married, then under the Maliki view 
the daughter cannot be forced into marriage regardless 
of her age; in that case she must reach the marriage de-
cision jointly with her waif. 
A well-established I:Ianafi line of thought views the 
mature woman who has reached puberty as capable of 
contracting her own marriage, with the waif playing a 
merely advisory role. However, if the woman ignores 
the wali's advice and marries someone "unsuitable," 
then the wall immediately acquires remarkable powers. 
He can move to void the marriage if no pregnancy has 
occurred. I:Ianafis and Malikis imbued the notion of 
"suitability" with culturally based class distinctions that 
were not present in its original articulation, which was 
based on piety. 
Ja'faris view a mature woman who has reached pu-
berty, whether a virgin or otherwise, as a full legal en-
tity coequal with her male counterpart. She is consid-
ered legally competent to make her own marriage 
avoidance of the marriage of a daughter who has 
reached majority. The Moroccan Personal Status Code 
(1957), which is basically Maliki, departs from the tradi-
tional Maliki position by prohibiting a wall from forcing 
his female ward into marriage, whether she is virgin or 
otherwise, if she has attained the age of majority. It 
does, however, instruct the woman to delegate her right 
to contract a marriage to her waif. Malik! and other ju-
rists have explained the need for such delegation as ema-
nating from a desire to shield the woman from the in-
dignity of being present among men to negotiate and 
execute her own marriage contract. 
The Tunisian Personal Status Code (1956, as 
amended), which is also basically Maliki, departs more 
fundamentally from such juri~prudence by abandoning 
the notion of wall altogether and adopting a position 
akin to that of the J a'faris. Once the prospective parties 
reach the age of majority, they may contract their own 
marriage or delegate that power to another, at their op-
tion. The consent of both husband and wife is required 
for a valid marriage, and the notion of "suitability" is 
absent from the code. 
All schools of thought have interpreted the Qur'an as 
permitting polygyny as long as certain conditions of fair-
ness are observed. The Tunisian code prohibits it. This 
prohibition, along with other departures like the ones 
discussed above, has been viewed by many as a reflec-
tion of Western colonial influences. Tunisian jurists in 
fact relied on the Qur' an and other basic sources in de-
veloping their arguments for prohibiting polygyny, but 
it is probably true that their desire to reexamine past 
ijtihlid on this issue was motivated by external Western 
influences. Still, even under a traditional analysis of po-
lygyny, there are legal approaches that enable a woman 
to guard against it in her own marriage. 
One such method is for the woman to specify in the 
marriage contract that her prospective husband may not 
marry a second wife. Unfortunately, the validity of this 
condition varies with the school. Ja'faris and Shilfi'is, 
for example, reject it as, respectively, contrary to Is-
lamic law and contrary to marital rights flowing from 
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the marriage contract; but in either case, both schools 
view the rest of the contract as valid. This result is quite 
harsh for a woman bent on protecting her marriage 
from polygyny. 
J:Ianafis also regard this condition as null and void; 
but as an inducement for women to marry, they recog-
nize the validity of a condition in the marriage contract 
that reserves for the woman the right to divorce her hus-
band at her option. Malikis accept the condition not to 
take a second wife as valid, but they discourage it. The 
condition giving the woman the right to divorce is also 
acceptable to them, but it is so bound to various formal 
and procedural requirements that it is hard for the aver-
age woman not to forfeit (or even fail initially to ac-
quire) such right inadvertently. In all jurisdictions, a 
woman may obtain divorce by giving up her dower 
(khul'), quite a hardship for a woman of modest means. 
She can also request a judicial divorce, which can be a 
lengthy procedure. 
The attitude of one line of thought among J:lanbalis 
toward a marriage condition preventing the husband 
from taking a second wife is closest to that of the 
Prophet, who stated that one's 'uhi.id (promises or un-
dertakings) must be fulfilled and that the 'uhiid most 
worthy of fulfillment are those of the marriage contract. 
Not only do J:Ianbalis view as valid this and all other 
conditiops which are not incompatible with Islamic law 
or the object of marriage; they also signal the seri-
ousness of violating such 'uhi.id by giving the party 
whose marriage condition has been violated the option 
of voiding the marriage (faskh). By contrast, l;lanafis, 
for example, specify a limited monetary remedy for 
such violations. 
Other laws relating, for example, to murah marriage 
(a form of temporary marriage accepted by Shi'is), 
spousal maintenance, the ability of the wife to work out-
side her home, the role of the husband in the family, 
the duties of the wife in a marriage, and child custody, 
have posed challenging questions to Muslim jurists in 
modern societies. In response, a movement to reinvigo-
rate ijtihiid and modernize family law in accordance with 
the Qur'an and sunnah is taking root around the Mus-
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Modern Practice 
Rules and procedures regarding marriage and divorce 
are stipulated in the Qur'an and regulated through the 
sharicah. Laws relating to marriage and divorce are thus 
part of the body of Islamic personal status law, the only 
aspect of shari'ah law that has been retained nearly in-
tact at the close of the twentieth century. 
Marriage in Islamic law is formalized by a contract 
(nikii}J) between the legal guardian of the bride-always 
a male and usually the bride's father-and the prospec-
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